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dc.rights.licenseRestricted to current Rensselaer faculty, staff and students. Access inquiries may be directed to the Rensselaer Libraries.
dc.contributorKar, Koushik
dc.contributorChow, J. H. (Joe H.), 1951-
dc.contributorGupta, Aparna
dc.contributor.authorBhattacharya, Saptarshi
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T08:17:47Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T08:17:47Z
dc.date.created2015-03-09T10:12:41Z
dc.date.issued2014-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13015/1281
dc.descriptionDecember 2014
dc.descriptionSchool of Engineering
dc.description.abstractIn the second part of this work, we extend the work of the first part by studying the energy supplier's problem of selling energy to the PEVs while buying the same from the generators (market) through an auction process. In this context, we analyze the properties of the elastic supply Multi-level Second Price (es-MSP) mechanism and the elastic-supply Progressive Second Price (es-PSP) auction mechanism. Similar to the previously proposed MSP mechanism, in the es-MSP mechanism, PEV agents are expected to declare their total valuations corresponding to a set of predefined energy levels. The es-PSP mechanism, like the PSP mechanism, requires each PEV agent to submit a desired energy quantity and a per-unit willingness-to-pay value. The proposed mechanisms in the second part of the work differ from the first part in the fact that the electricity to be allocated to the participating >PEVs is treated as an elastic resource with variable supply. We establish that social efficiency is attained at Nash equilibria, and PEV agents acting in self-interest have no incentive to untruthfully declare their willingness-to-pay value for the quantity they choose to declare, given a set of bid profiles for other users being constant. As in the first part, we also validate some of our theoretical results through simulations in a specific distribution network scenario.
dc.description.abstractRecent years have witnessed an increasing deployment of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs), mainly in the urban scenario. This need has been largely triggered by a worldwide consensus for moving towards cleaner and greener transportation options in the wake of today's global environmental crisis. Large scale penetration of PEVs in the transportation sector is a major possibility in the coming days, owing to the advancements being made in hardware technology that is bringing down manufacturing costs of PEVs and making them economically feasible to the average urban user. In such a case, the electricity distribution grid suffers from the possibility of facing congestion related issues when large fleets of PEVs begin to draw power for their plying needs. Power engineers must be able to develop charging protocols that are able to relieve the distribution grid of major congestion related stresses and also ensure that the PEVs are charged to the satisfaction of the owners. This need has led to a worldwide thrust in developing smart charging protocols within the realm of the smart distribution grid.
dc.description.abstractIn the first part of this work, we explore the question of efficient allocation of fixed amounts of electrical energy (charging rates and schedules) to PEVs by the aggregator (electricity utility) through an auction mechanism. Recognizing the practical limitations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism which would be natural to apply in this context, we investigate two practical mechanisms that can be viewed as extensions of second price auction mechanisms, and have limited message (bid) complexity. In the first mechanism, the multi-level second price (MSP) mechanism, each PEV agent submits a number of price bids, one for each of a given set of energy levels (energy quantities). In the second mechanism, the progressive second price (PSP) mechanism, the PEV agents submit a two-dimensional bid indicating the price as well as the desired energy quantity. Taking into account the differences across PEV-owners in terms of their willingness-to-pay values and charging time constraints, we analyze the social optimality and incentive compatibility properties of the two auction mechanisms. We demonstrate some of our theoretical results by numerical studies conducted in a specic distribution network scenario.
dc.language.isoENG
dc.publisherRensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
dc.relation.ispartofRensselaer Theses and Dissertations Online Collection
dc.subjectElectrical engineering
dc.titleExtended second price auctions for plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging in smart grid
dc.typeElectronic thesis
dc.typeThesis
dc.digitool.pid174721
dc.digitool.pid174722
dc.digitool.pid174723
dc.rights.holderThis electronic version is a licensed copy owned by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY. Copyright of original work retained by author.
dc.description.degreeMS
dc.relation.departmentDept. of Electrical, Computer, and Systems Engineering


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