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dc.rights.licenseRestricted to current Rensselaer faculty, staff and students. Access inquiries may be directed to the Rensselaer Libraries.
dc.contributorSharkey, Thomas C.
dc.contributorWallace, William A.
dc.contributorMitchell, John E.
dc.contributorAnshelevich, Elliot
dc.contributor.authorSun, Hongtan
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T09:20:40Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T09:20:40Z
dc.date.created2021-01-06T10:12:14Z
dc.date.issued2017-08
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13015/2574
dc.descriptionAugust 2017
dc.descriptionSchool of Engineering
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation project, we investigate approximation algorithms and the cost of decentralized decision-making arising from problems in post-disaster infrastructure network restoration. Problems arising both in single infrastructure network restoration and multi-infrastructure network restoration are investigated.
dc.description.abstractIn the area of single infrastructure restoration, we investigate a fractional optimization problem arising in dispatching rules for Integrated Network Design and Scheduling (INDS) problems. We demonstrate the NP-hardness for the fractional optimization and provide tight approximation guarantees for the dispatching rules.
dc.description.abstractDespite the wide existence of interdependencies, post-disaster restoration efforts for interdependent multi-infrastructure systems are often made in a decentralized manner as each infrastructure sets their individual work schedule towards its own best performance. We examine Algorithmic Game Theory and develop Decentralized Interdependent Scheduling (DIS) framework to model these interactions between infrastructures and to quantify the impacts of decentralization using the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). Upper bounds for the PoA and the PoS are demonstrated to depend linearly on the sum of the processing times of the restoration tasks across the system. Mixed integer program constraints are formulated to characterize Nash equilibria and an incentive structure for Incomplete Information Simple External Dependency DIS Games (iSEDGs). In numerical experiments, the constraints are used to evaluate the PoA and the PoS for iSEDGs, their upper bounds and improved PoS under incentive structure. In many cases, the PoA and the PoS could be improved by incentivizing players with external fund.
dc.language.isoENG
dc.publisherRensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
dc.relation.ispartofRensselaer Theses and Dissertations Online Collection
dc.subjectDecision sciences and engineering systems
dc.titleOn approximation algorithms and the cost of decentralization for problems in network restoration
dc.typeElectronic thesis
dc.typeThesis
dc.digitool.pid180216
dc.digitool.pid180217
dc.digitool.pid180218
dc.rights.holderThis electronic version is a licensed copy owned by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY. Copyright of original work retained by author.
dc.description.degreePhD
dc.relation.departmentDept. of Industrial and Systems Engineering


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