Toxic chemicals, environmental organizations, and the governance of science and technology in the EU and the US : the case of nanotechnology

Abstract

This dissertation explores the involvement of various CSOs (NGOs, TUs, think tanks, and other advocacy groups) in the debate about the regulation of nanomaterials in the EU and the US. How do these two political structures involve advocacy groups in the development of regulatory policy? What are the results of such involvement? The findings of this research indicate that even though the EU and US think differently about regulation and involve CSOs in distinct ways, the results of the advocacy activities in both political structures are similar. Why is it that CSOs do not successfully influence regulatory outcomes in the EU even though there is an elaborate system with official participation from CSOs, a very strict framework based on the precautionary principle, and a Green Party with opinions very similar to these of the CSOs and with abilities and political opportunities to influence one of the co-legislators, the EU Parliament? This dissertation suggests that the unequal distribution of power in the government structures, unequal distribution of power within the areas where advocacy groups usually are involved, mainly very powerful industrial interests, CSOs with moderate position and professionalized approaches, and a regulatory focus on the implementation level, which is very technical, results in outcomes other than those that CSOs have supported.