Three essays in corporate finance

Authors
Samuel, Gilna K. R.
ORCID
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Other Contributors
Francis, Bill
Clark, Brian J.
Wu, Qiang
Hasan, Iftekhar
Issue Date
2018-08
Keywords
Management
Degree
PhD
Terms of Use
This electronic version is a licensed copy owned by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY. Copyright of original work retained by author.
Full Citation
Abstract
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of the market for corporate control on firm-level organization capital. I use the enactment of antitakeover laws as an exogenous decrease in the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. The results show that organization capital decreases after the enactment of antitakeover laws. These results are verified through various endogeneity and robustness tests. I find that the enactment of antitakeover laws has a less pronounced impact on brand capital and R&D. Also, stronger corporate governance mitigates the decrease in organization capital. I show that this decline in organization capital contributed to the decline in firm value after enactment of antitakeover laws. Moreover, I find that reductions in the inflow of inventors, total factor productivity and labor mobility are possible mechanisms through which antitakeover laws impact organization capital.
Description
August 2018
School of Management
Department
Lally School of Management
Publisher
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
Relationships
Rensselaer Theses and Dissertations Online Collection
Access
Restricted to current Rensselaer faculty, staff and students. Access inquiries may be directed to the Rensselaer Libraries.