Reason and rationality in nuclear deterrence : implementing an approach to nuclear crisis resolution using meta-game theory

Authors
McCarty, Evan
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Other Contributors
Bringsjord, Selmer
Sun, Ron, 1960-
Nirenburg, Sergei
Issue Date
2014-08
Keywords
Computer science
Degree
MS
Terms of Use
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
This electronic version is a licensed copy owned by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY. Copyright of original work retained by author.
Full Citation
Abstract
Nuclear deterrence has been an important political goal for decades. It involves a strategy, cooperation and an understanding of the options and rationale of all parties involved. Simulations of these scenarios are very valuable, but pose unique challenges from a mathematical standpoint. While each simulation tech- nique poses its own strengths and weaknesses, game theory provides a desirable framework for modeling competitive, two-agent scenarios. However, there are some improvements still to be made. This paper will propose and demonstrate a simple implementation of a computational meta-game theory approach which we expect to outperform traditional game theory. This approach is able to in- crease expressivity and adaptability without expense to accuracy.
Description
August 2014
School of Science
Department
Dept. of Computer Science
Publisher
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
Relationships
Rensselaer Theses and Dissertations Online Collection
Access
CC BY-NC-ND. Users may download and share copies with attribution in accordance with a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. No commercial use or derivatives are permitted without the explicit approval of the author.